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Abstract. Light clients, also known as Simple Payment Verification
(SPV) clients, are nodes which only download a small portion of the data
in a blockchain, and use indirect means to verify that a given chain is
valid. Typically, instead of validating block data, they assume that the
chain favoured by the blockchain’s consensus algorithm only contains
valid blocks, and that the majority of block producers are honest. By al-
lowing such clients to receive fraud proofs generated by fully validating
nodes that show that a block violates the protocol rules, and combining
this with probabilistic sampling techniques to verify that all of the data
in a block actually is available to be downloaded, we can eliminate the
honest-majority assumption for block validity, and instead make much
weaker assumptions about a minimum number of honest nodes that re-
broadcast data. Fraud and data availability proofs are key to enabling
on-chain scaling of blockchains (e.g., via sharding or bigger blocks) while
maintaining a strong assurance that on-chain data is available and valid.
We present, implement, and evaluate a novel fraud and data availability
proof system.
1 Introduction and Motivation
As cryptocurrencies and smart contract platforms have gained wider adoption,
the scalability limitations of existing blockchains have been observed in practice.
Popular services have stopped accepting Bitcoin [26] payments due to transac-
tions fees rising as high as $20 [19,28], and Ethereum’s [6] popular CryptoKitties
smart contract caused the pending transactions backlog to increase six-fold [40].
Users pay higher fees as they compete to get their transactions included on the
blockchain, due to on-chain space being limited, e.g., by Bitcoin’s block size
limit [2] or Ethereum’s block gas limit [41].
While increasing on-chain capacity limits would yield higher transaction
throughput, there are concerns that this would decrease decentralisation and
security, because it would increase the resources required to fully download and
validate the blockchain, and thus fewer users would be able to afford to run full
nodes that independently validate the blockchain, requiring users to instead run
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light clients that assume that the chain favoured by the blockchain’s consensus
algorithm abides by the protocol rules for transaction validity [23]. Light clients
operate well under normal circumstances, but have weaker assurances when the
majority of the consensus (e.g., miners or block producers) is dishonest; for ex-
ample, whereas a dishonest majority in the Bitcoin or Ethereum network can at
present only censor, reverse or reorder transactions, if all clients are using light
nodes, a majority of the consensus would be able to collude together to generate
blocks that contain contain invalid transactions that, for example, create money
out of thin air, and light nodes would not be able to detect this. On the other
hand, full nodes would reject those invalid blocks immediately.
As a result, various scalability efforts have focused on off-chain scaling tech-
niques such as payment channels [31], where participants sign transactions off-
blockchain, and settle the final balance on-chain. Payment channels have also
been generalised to state channels [25]. However, as opening and settling channels
involves on-chain transactions, on-chain scaling is still necessary for widespread
adoption of payment and state channels.3
In this paper, we decrease the on-chain capacity vs. security trade-off by mak-
ing it possible for light clients to receive and verify fraud proofs of invalid blocks
from full nodes, so that they too can reject them, assuming that there is at least
one honest full node willing to generate fraud proofs to be propagated within
a maximum network delay. We also design a data availability proof system, a
necessary complement to fraud proofs, so that light clients have assurance that
the block data required for full nodes to generate fraud proofs from is available,
given that there is a minimum number of honest light clients to reconstruct miss-
ing data from blocks. We implement and evaluate the security and efficiency of
our overall design.
Our work also plays a key role in efforts to scale blockchains with sharding
[1, 7, 20], as in a sharded system no single node in the network is expected to
download and validate the state of all shards, and thus fraud proofs are necessary
to detect invalid blocks from malicious shards.
2 Background
2.1 Blockchain Models
Briefly, the data structure of a blockchain consists of (literally) a chain of blocks.
Each block contains two components: a header and a list of transactions. In ad-
dition to other metadata, the header stores at minimum the hash of the previous
3 Suppose a setting where all users used channels and channels only needed to be
opened once and maintained with on-chain transactions once per year per used.
To support a userbase equal in size to Facebook’s (≈ 2.2 billion [27]), one would
need 2.2 billion transactions per year, or ≈ 70 transactions per second, significantly
higher than supported by the Bitcoin or Ethereum blockchains [10, 44]. This does
not take into account usages that require “going on-chain” more frequently, users
requiring multiple channels, or the possibility of attacks on channels requiring more
transactions to process.
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block (thus enabling the chain property), and the root of the Merkle tree that
consists of all transactions in the block.
Blockchain networks have a consensus algorithm [3] to determine which chain
should be favoured in the event of a fork, e.g., if proof-of-work [26] is used, then
the chain with the most accumulated work is favoured. They also have a set
of transaction validity rules that dictate which transactions are valid, and thus
blocks that contain invalid transactions will never be favoured by the consensus
algorthim and should in fact always be rejected.
Full nodes are nodes which download block headers as well as the list of
transactions, verifying that the transactions are valid according to some trans-
action validity rules. Light clients only download block headers, and assume that
the list of transactions are valid according to the transaction validity rules. Light
clients verify blocks against the consensus rules, but not the transaction validity
rules, and thus assume that the consensus is honest in that they only included
valid transactions. Light clients can receive Merkle proofs from full nodes that
a specific transaction or state object is included in a block header.
There are two major types of blockchain transaction models: Unspent Trans-
action Output (UTXO)-based, and account-based. Transactions in UTXO-based
blockchains (e.g., Bitcoin) contain references to previous transactions whose
coins they wish to ‘spend’. As a single transaction may send coins to multiple
addresses, a transaction has many ‘outputs’, and thus new transactions contain
references to these specific outputs. Each output can only be spent once.
On the other hand, account-based blockchains (e.g., Ethereum), are some-
what simpler to work with (though sometimes more complex to apply paralleli-
sation techniques to), as each transaction simply specifies a balance transfer from
one address to another, without reference to previous transactions. In Ethereum,
the block header also contains a root to a Merkle tree containing the state, which
is the ‘current’ information that is required to verify the next block; in Ethereum
this consists of the balance, code and permanent storage of all of the accounts
and contracts in the system.
2.2 Merkle Trees and Sparse Merkle Trees
A Merkle tree [24] is a binary tree where every non-leaf node is labelled with
the cryptographic hash of the concatenation of its children nodes. The root of
a Merkle tree is thus a commitment to all of the items in its leaf nodes. This
allows for Merkle proofs, which given some Merkle root, are proofs that a leaf
is a part of the tree committed to by the root. A Merkle proof for some leaf
consists of all of the ancestor and ancestor’s sibling intermediate nodes for that
leaf, up to the root of the tree, thus forming a sub-tree whose Merkle root can
be recomputed to verify that the Merkle proof is valid. The size and verification
time of a Merkle proof for a tree with n leaves is O(log(n)), as it is a tree.
A sparse Merkle tree [12, 21] is a Merkle tree with n leaves where n is ex-
tremely large (e.g., n = 2256), but where almost all of the nodes have the same
default value (e.g., 0). If k nodes are non-zero, then at each intermediate level
of the tree there will be a maximum of k non-zero values, and all other values
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will be the same default value for that level: 0 at the bottom level, L1 = H(0, 0)
at the first intermediate level, L2 = H(L1, L1) at the second intermediate level,
and so on. Hence, despite the exponentially large number of nodes in the tree,
the root of the tree can be calculated in O(k × log(n)) time. A sparse Merkle
tree allows for commitments to key-value maps, where values can be updated, in-
serted or deleted trivially in O(log(n)) time. Merkle proofs of specific key-values
entries are of size log(n) if constructed naively but can be compressed to size
log(k) as intermediate nodes whose sibling have the default value do not need
to explicitly be shown.
Systems such as Ripple and Ethereum at present use Patricia trees instead
of sparse Merkle trees [35, 41]; we use sparse Merkle trees in this paper because
of their greater simplicity.
2.3 Erasure Codes and Reed-Solomon Codes
Erasure codes are error-correcting codes [14, 30] working under the assumption
of bit erasures rather than bit errors; in particular, the users knows which bits
have to be reconstructed. Error-correcting codes transform a message of length
k into a longer message of length n > k such that the original message can be
recovered from a subset of the n symbols.
Reed-Solomon (RS) codes [39] have various applications and are among the
most studied error-correcting codes. A Reed-Solomon code encodes data by
treating a length-k message as a list of elements x0, x1, ..., xk−1 in some finite
field (prime fields and binary fields are most frequently used), interpolating the
polynomial P (x) where P (i) = xi for all 0 ≤ i < k, and then extending the
list with xk, xk+1, ..., xn−1 where xi = P (i). The polynomial P can be recov-
ered from any k symbols from this longer list using techniques such as Lagrange
interpolation, or more optimized and advanced techniques involving tools such
as Fast Fourier transforms, and knowing P one can then recover the original
message. Reed-Solomon codes can detect and correct any combination of up to
n−k
2 errors, or combinations of errors and erasures. RS codes have been gen-
eralised to multidimensional codes [13, 36] in various ways [34, 37, 42]. In a d-
dimensional code, the message is encoded into a square or cube or hybercube
of size k × k × ... × k, and a multidimensional polynomial P (x1, x2, ..., xd) is
interpolated where P (i1, i2, ..., in) = xi1,i2...,in , and this polynomial is extended
to a larger n× n× ...× n square or cube or hypercube.
3 Assumptions and Threat Model
We present the network and threat model under which our fraud proofs (Sec-
tion 4) and data availability proofs (Section 5) apply.
3.1 Preliminaries
We present some primitives that we use in the rest of the paper.
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– hash(x) is a cryptographically secure hash function that returns the digest
of x (e.g., SHA-256).
– root(L) returns the Merkle root for a list of items L.
– {e→ r} denotes a Merkle proof that an element e is a member of the Merkle
tree committed by root r.
– VerifyMerkleProof(e, {e→ r}, r, n, i) returns true if the Merkle proof is valid,
otherwise false, where n additionally denotes the total number of elements
in the underlying tree and i is the index of e in the tree. This verifies that e
is at index i, as well as its membership.
– {k, v → r} denotes a Merkle proof that a key-value pair k, v is a member of
the Sparse Merkle tree committed by root r.
3.2 Blockchain Model
We assume a generalised blockchain architecture, where the blockchain con-
sists of a hash-based chain of block headers H = (h0, h1, ..., hn). Each block
header hi contains a Merkle root txRooti of a list of transactions Ti, such that
root(Ti) = txRooti. Given a node that downloads the list of transactions Ni from
the network, a block header hi is considered to be valid if (i) root(Ni) = ri and
(ii) given some validity function
valid(T, S) ∈ {true, false}
where T is a list of transactions and S is the state of the blockchain, then
valid(Ti, Si−1) must return true, where Si is the state of the blockchain after
applying all of the transactions in Ti. We assume that valid(T, S) takes O(n)
time to execute, where n is the number of transactions in T .
In terms of transactions, we assume that given a list of transactions Ti =
(t0i , t
1
i , ..., t
n
i ), where t
j
i denotes a transaction j at block i, there exists a state
transition function transition that returns the post-state S′ of executing a trans-
action on a particular pre-state S, or an error if the transition is illegal:
transition(S, t) ∈ {S′, err}
transition(err, t) = err
Thus given the intermediate post-states after applying every transaction one
at a time, Iji = transition(I
j−1
i , t
j
i ), and the base case I
−1
i = Si−1, then Si =
Ini . Hence, I
j
i denotes the intermediate state of the blockchain at block i after
applying transactions t0i , t
1
i , ..., t
j
i .
Therefore, valid(Ti, Si−1) = true if and only if Ini 6= err.
In Section 4.2, we explain how both a UTXO-based (e.g., Bitcoin) and an
account-based (e.g., Ethereum) blockchain can be represented by this model.
Aim. Our aim is to prove to clients that for a given block header hi, valid(Ti, Si−i)
returns false in less than O(n) time and less than O(n) space, relying on as few
security assumptions as possible.
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3.3 Network Model
We assume a network that consists of two types of nodes:
– Full nodes. These are nodes which download and verify the entire blockchain.
Honest full nodes store and rebroadcast valid blocks that they download to
other full nodes, and broadcast block headers associated with valid blocks
to light clients. Some of these nodes may participate in consensus (i.e., by
producing blocks).
– Light clients. These are nodes with computational capacity and network
bandwidth that is too low to download and verify the entire blockchain.
They receive block headers from full nodes, and on request, Merkle proofs
that some transaction or state is a part of the block header.
We assume a network topology as shown in Figure 1; full nodes communi-
cate with each other, and light clients communicate with full nodes, but light
clients do not communicate with each other. Additionally, we assume a maxi-
mum network delay δ; such that if one honest node can connect to the network
and download some data (e.g., a block) at time T , then it is guaranteed that
any other honest node will be able to do the same at time T ′ ≤ T + δ.
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blocks that violate any of these rules. We consider these to be the minimum set
of rules required to build an operational blockchain.
A block consists of a sequence of O(1)-sized transactions. We assume that
there exists a ”state” S, and a state transition function F (S, tx) = S0 that
computes the ”post-state” of executing a given transaction given a particular
”pre-state”. We assume that computing tx requires reading and writing O(1)
state entires from S. F may also return INVALID if tx is invalid in the context
of S (e.g. S says that Alice has 50 coins, tx is Alice attempting to send 100 coins
to Bob).
4 Fraud Proofs
light
Fig. 1: Overview of the architecture of a fraud proof system at a network level.
4.1 Block Structure
In order to support e cient fraud proofs (i.e. the maximum size of a fraud proof
is less than O(n) where n is the size of a block), it is necessary to design a
blockchain data structure that supports fraud proof generation by design. We
define the block header below.
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A block consists of a equence of O(1)-sized transactions. We assume that
there exists ”st te” S, and a state transition function F (S, tx) = S0 that
computes the ”post-state” of execu ng a given tra saction given a particular
”pre-state”. We assum hat computing tx requires reading d writing O(1)
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of S (e.g. S says hat Alic a 50 coins, tx is Alice attempting o s nd 100 coins
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4.1 Block Structure
In order to support e cient fraud proofs (i.e. the maximum size of a fraud proof
is l ss than O(n) where n is the size of a block), it is necessary to design a
blockchain ata structure that s fraud proof generation by design. We
d fine the block header elow.
Fig. 1: Network m del—full no communicate with each other, and light clients
communicate only with full nod s.
3.4 Threat Model
We make the following assumptions in our threat model:
– Blocks and consensus. Block headers may be created by adversarial ac-
tors, and thus may be invalid, and there is no honest majority of consensus-
participating nodes that we can rely on.
– Full nodes. Full nodes may be dishonest, e.g., they may not relay infor-
mation (e.g., fraud proofs), or they may relay invalid blocks. However, we
assume that there is at least one honest full node that is connected to the
network (i.e., it is online, willing to generate and distribute fraud proofs,
and is not under an eclipse attack [18]).
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– Light clients. We assume that each light client is connected to at least
one honest full node. For data availability proofs, we assume a minimum
number of honest light clients to allow for a block to be reconstructed. The
specific number depends on the parameters of the system, and is analysed
in Section 5.6.
Note that our goal is specifically to ensure that light clients do not ac-
cept blocks with invalid transactions, in the presence of a dishonest majority
of consensus-participating nodes. This is different to double spending attacks,
where a dishonest majority forks the chain to undo valid transactions, which is
not the focus of this paper. An honest majority assumption is still necessary to
prevent double spending attacks for both full nodes and light clients—our goal is
to eliminate this assumption for transaction validity, thus significantly limiting
the damage that a dishonest majority can do.
4 Fraud Proofs
head
tx
data
head
tx
data
head
tx
data
... ...
light
client
full
node
fraud
proof
Fig. 2: Overview of the architecture of a fraud proof system at a network level.
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4.1 Block Structure
In order to support efficient fraud proofs, it is necessary to design a blockchain
data structure that supports fraud proof generation by design. Extending the
model described in Section 3.2, a block header hi at height i contains the fol-
lowing elements:
prevHashi The hash of the previous block header in the chain.
dataRooti The root of the Merkle tree of the data (e.g., transactions) included
in the block.
dataLengthi The number of leaves represented by dataRooti.
stateRooti The root of a sparse Merkle tree of the state of the blockchain (to be
described in Section 4.2).
additionalDatai Additional arbitrary data that may be required by the network
(e.g., in proof-of-work, this may include a nonce and the target difficulty
threshold).
Additionally, the hash of each block header blockHashi = hash(hi) is also
stored by clients and nodes.
Note that typically blockchains have the Merkle root of transactions included
in headers. We have abstracted this to a ‘Merkle root of data’ called dataRooti,
because as we shall see in Section 4.3, as well as including transactions in the
block data, we also need to include intermediate state roots.
4.2 State Root and Execution Trace Construction
To instantiate a blockchain based on the state-based model described in Sec-
tion 3.2, we make use of sparse Merkle trees, and represent the state as a
key-value map. We explain how both a UTXO-based and an account-based
blockchain can be instantiated atop such a model:
– UTXO-based. The keys in the map are transaction output identifiers e.g.,
hash(hash(d)||i) where d is the data of the transaction and i is the index
of the output being referred to in d. The value of each key is the state of
each transaction output identifier: either unspent (1) or nonexistent (0, the
default value).
– Account-based. This is already a key-value map, where the key is the
account or storage variable, and the value is the balance of the account or
the value of the variable.
The state would need to keep track of all data that is relevant to block
processing, including for example the cumulative transaction fees paid to the
creator of the current block after each transaction.
We now define a variation of the function transition defined in Section 3.2,
called rootTransition, that performs transitions without requiring the whole state
tree, but only the state root and Merkle proofs of parts of the state tree that
the transaction reads or modifies (which we call “state witness”, or w for short).
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These Merkle proofs are effectively expressed as a sub-tree of the same state tree
with a common root.
rootTransition(stateRoot, t, w) ∈ {stateRoot′, err}
A state witness w consists of a set of key-value pairs and their associated
Sparse Merkle proofs in the state tree, w = {(k1, v1, {k1, v1 → stateRoot}), (k2, v2,
{k2, v2 → stateRoot}), ..., (kn, vn, {kn, vn → stateRoot})}.
After executing t on the parts of the state shown by w, if t modifies any of
the state, then the new resulting stateRoot′ can be generated by computing the
root of the new sub-tree with the modified leafs. Note that if w is invalid and
does not contain all of the parts of the state required by t during execution, then
err is returned.
Let us denote, for the list of transactions Ti = (t
0
i , t
1
i , ..., t
n
i ), where t
j
i denotes
a transaction j at block i, then wji is the state witness for transaction w
j
i for
stateRooti.
Thus given the intermediate state roots after applying every transaction one
at a time, interRootji = rootTransition(interRoot
j−1
i , t
j
i , w
j
i ), and the base case
interRoot−1i = stateRooti−1, then stateRooti = interRoot
n
i . Hence, interRoot
j
i de-
notes the intermediate state root at block i after applying transactions t0i , t
1
i , ..., t
j
i .
4.3 Data Root and Periods
end of tx 2 from
previous share entire tx 3
interm.
root start of tx 4
first byte = 80 (start position of tx 3)
0 1 80 170 190 256
Fig. 3: Example of a 256-byte share.
The data represented by the dataRooti of a block contains transactions ar-
ranged into fixed-size chunks of data called ‘shares’, interspersed with intermedi-
ate state roots called ‘traces’ between transactions. We denote traceji as the jth
intermediate state root in block i. It is necessary to arrange data into fixed-size
shares to allow for data availability proofs as we shall see in Section 5. Each leaf
in the data tree represents a share.
As a share may not contain entire transactions but only parts of transactions
as shown in Figure 3, we may reserve the first byte in each share to be the starting
position of the first transaction that starts in the share, or 0 if no transaction
starts in the share. This allows a protocol message parser to establish the message
boundaries without needing every transaction in the block.
Given a list of shares (sh0, sh1, ..., shn) we define a function parseShares which
parses these shares and outputs an ordered list of t messages (m0,m1, ...,mt),
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which are either transactions or intermediate state roots. For example, parseShares
on some shares in the middle of some block i may return (trace1i , t
4
i , t
5
i , t
6
i , trace
2
i ).
parseShares((sh0, sh1, ..., shn)) = (m0,m1, ...,mt)
Note that as the block data does not necessarily contain an intermediate state
root after every transaction, we assume a ‘period criterion’, a protocol rule that
defines how often an intermediate state root should be included in the block’s
data. For example, the rule could be at least once every p transactions, or b bytes
or g gas (i.e., in Ethereum [41]).
We thus define a function parsePeriod which parses a list of messages, and re-
turns a pre-state intermediate root tracexi , a post-state intermediate root trace
x+1
i ,
and a list of transaction (tgi , t
g+1
i , ..., t
g+h
i ) such that applying these transactions
on tracexi is expected to return trace
x+1
i . If the list of messages violate the period
criterion, then the function may return err, for example if there are too many
transactions in the messages to constitute a period.
parsePeriod((m0,m1, ...,mt)) ∈ {(tracexi , tracex+1i , (tgi , tg+1i , ..., tg+hi )), err}
Note that tracexi may be nil if no pre-state root was parsed, as this may be
the case if the first messages in the block are being parsed, and thus the pre-state
root is the state root of the previous block stateRooti−i. Likewise, tracex+1i may
be nil if no post-state root was parsed i.e., if the last messages in the block are
being parsed, as the post-state root would be stateRooti.
4.4 Proof of Invalid State Transition
A faulty or malicious miner may provide an incorrect stateRooti. We can use the
execution trace provided in dataRooti to prove that some part of the execution
trace was invalid.
We define a function VerifyTransitionFraudProof and its parameters which
verifies fraud proofs received from full nodes. We denote dji as share number j
in block i.
Summary of VerifyTransitionFraudProof. A fraud proof consists of the
relevant shares in the block that contain a bad state transition, Merkle proofs
for those shares, and the state witnesses for the transactions contained in those
shares. The function takes as input a fraud proof, and checks if applying the
transactions in a period of the block’s data on the intermediate pre-state root
results in the intermediate post-state root specified in the block data. If it does
not, then the fraud proof is valid, and the block that the fraud proof is for should
be permanently rejected by the client.
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VerifyTransitionFraudProof(blockHashi,
(dyi , d
y+1
i , ..., d
y+m
i ), y, (shares)
({dyi → dataRooti}, {dy+1i → dataRooti}, ..., {dy+mi → dataRooti}),
(wyi , w
y+1
i , ..., w
y+m
i ), (state witnesses)
) ∈ {true, false}
VerifyTransitionFraudProof returns true if all of the following conditions are
met, otherwise false is returned:
1. blockHashi corresponds to a block header hi that the client has downloaded
and stored.
2. For each share dy+ai in the proof, VerifyMerkleProof(d
y+a
i , {dy+ai → dataRooti},
dataRooti, dataLengthi, y + a) returns true.
3. Given parsePeriod(parseShares((dyi , d
y+1
i , ..., d
y+m
i ))) ∈ {(tracexi , tracex+1i , (tgi ,
tg+1i , ..., t
g+h
i )), err}, the result must not be err. If tracexi is nil, then y = 0 is
true, and if tracex+1i is nil, then y +m = dataLengthi is true.
4. Check that applying (tgi , t
g+1
i , ..., t
g+h
i ) on trace
x
i results in trace
x+1
i . For-
mally, let the intermediate state roots after applying every transaction in
the proof one at a time be interRootji = rootTransition(interRoot
j−1
i , t
j
i , w
j
i ).
If tracexi is not nil, then the base case is interRoot
y
i = trace
x
i , otherwise
interRootyi = stateRooti−1. If trace
x+1
i is not nil, trace
x+1
i = interRoot
g+h
i is
true, otherwise stateRooti = interRoot
y+m
i is true.
4
4.5 Transaction Fees
As discussed in Section 4.2, the state would need to keep track of all data that
is relevant to block processing. A block producer may attempt to collect more
transaction fees than is afforded to them by the transactions in the block. In
order to make this detectable by a fraud proof as part of the model we have
described, we can introduce a special key in the state tree called fees , which
represents the cumulative fees in the block after applying each transaction, and
is reset to 0 after applying the transaction where the block producer collects the
fees.
5 Data Availability Proofs
A malicious block producer could prevent full nodes from generating fraud proofs
by withholding the data needed to recompute dataRooti and only releasing the
4 For simplicity, we assume a model where state witnesses are provided for every
individual intermediate state root within the trace, but it is also possible to only
provide state witnesses only for the trace intermediate pre-state root, and execute
the transactions as a single batch.
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block header to the network. The block producer could then only release the
data—which may contain invalid transactions or state transitions—long after
the block has been published, and make the block invalid. This would cause a
rollback of transactions on the ledger of future blocks. It is therefore necessary
for light clients to have a level of assurance that the data matching dataRooti is
indeed available to the network.
We propose a data availability scheme based on Reed-Solomon erasure cod-
ing, where light clients request random shares of data to get high probability
guarantees that all the data associated with the root of a Merkle tree is avail-
able. The scheme assumes there is a sufficient number of honest light clients
making the same requests such that the network can recover the data, as light
clients upload these shares to full nodes, if a full node who does not have the
complete data requests it. It is fundamental for light clients to have assurance
that all the transaction data is available, because it is only necessary to withhold
a few bytes to hide an invalid transaction in a block.
We define below soundness and agreement and analyse them in Section 5.7.
Definition 1 (Soundness). If an honest light client accepts a block as avail-
able, then at least one honest full node has the full block data or will have the
full block data within some known maximum delay k ∗ δ where δ is the maximum
network delay.
Definition 2 (Agreement). If an honest light client accepts a block as avail-
able, then all other honest light clients will accept that block as available within
some known maximum delay k ∗ δ where δ is the maximum network delay.
5.1 Strawman 1D Reed-Solomon Availability Scheme
To provide some intuition, we first describe a strawman data availability scheme,
based on standard Reed-Solomon coding.
A block producer compiles a block of data consisting of k shares, extends
the data to 2k shares using Reed-Solomon encoding, and computes a Merkle
root (the dataRooti) over the extended data, where each leaf corresponds to one
share.
When light clients receive a block header with this dataRooti, they randomly
sample shares from the Merkle tree that dataRooti represents, and only accept
a block once it has received all of the shares requested. If an adversarial block
producer makes more than 50% of the shares unavailable to make the full data
unrecoverable (recall in Section 2.3 that Reed-Solomon codes allow recovery of
2t shares from any t shares), there is a 50% chance that a client will randomly
sample an unavailable share in the first draw, a 25% chance after two draws, a
12.5% chance after three draws, and so on, if they draw with replacement. (In
the full scheme, they will draw without replacement, and so the probability will
be even lower.)
Note that for this scheme to work, there must be enough light clients in
the network sampling enough shares so that block producers will be required to
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release more than 50% of the shares in order to pass the sampling challenge of all
light clients, and so that the full block can be recovered. An in-depth probability
and security analysis is provided in Section 5.6.
The problem with this scheme is that an adversarial block producer may
incorrectly construct the extended data, and thus the incomplete block is unre-
coverable from the extended data even if more than 50% of the data is available.
With standard Reed-Solomon encoding, the fraud proof that the extended data
is invalid is the original data itself, as clients would have to re-encode all data
locally to verify the mismatch with the given extended data, and thus it re-
quires O(n) data with respect to the size of the block. Therefore, we instead
use multi-dimensional encoding, as described in Section 5.2, so that proofs of
incorrectly generated codes are limited to a specific axis—rather than the entire
data—reducing proof size to O( d
√
n) where d is the number of dimensions of the
encoding. For simplicity, we will only consider two-dimensional Reed-Solomon
encoding in this paper, but our scheme can be generalised to higher dimensions.
We note in Section 7.1 that succinct proofs of computation could be an
alternative future solution to this problem instead of multi-dimensional encoding.
5.2 2D Reed-Solomon Encoded Merkle Tree Construction
c1 ck c2k
r1
rk
r2k
…
… original tx

data
extended

data
extended

data
extended

data
columnRoots
ro
w
Ro
ot
s
dataRoot
Fig. 4: Diagram showing a 2D Reed-Solomon encoding. The original data is ini-
tially arranged in a k × k matrix, which is then ‘extended’ to a 2k × 2k matrix
applying multiple times Reed-Solomon encoding.
14 Mustafa Al-Bassam, Alberto Sonnino, and Vitalik Buterin
A 2D Reed-Solomon Encoded Merkle tree can be constructed as follows from
a block of data:
1. Split the raw data into shares of size shareSize each, and arrange them into a
k× k matrix; apply padding if the last share is not exactly of size shareSize,
or if there are not enough shares to complete the matrix.
2. Apply Reed-Solomon encoding on each row and column of the k× k matrix
to extend the data horizontally and vertically; i.e., encode each row and each
column. Then apply a third time a Reed-Solomon encoding horizontally, on
the vertically extended portion of the matrix to create a 2k × 2k matrix, as
shown in Figure 4. This results in an extended matrix Mi for block i.
3. Compute the root of the Merkle tree for each row and column in the 2k×2k
matrix, where each leaf is a share. We have rowRootji = root((M
j,1
i ,M
j,2
i ,
...,M j,2ki )) and columnRoot
j
i = root((M
1,j
i ,M
2,j
i , ...,M
2k,j
i )), where M
x,y
i
represents the share in row x, column y in the matrix.
4. Compute the root of the Merkle tree of the roots computed in step 3 and
use this as dataRooti. We have dataRooti = root((rowRoot
1
i , rowRoot
2
i , ...,
rowRoot2ki , columnRoot
1
i , columnRoot
2
i , ..., columnRoot
2k
i )).
The resulting tree of dataRooti has dataLengthi = 2× (2k)2 elements, where
the first 12dataLengthi elements are in leaves via the row roots, and the latter
half are in leaves via the column roots.
Note that although it is possible to present a Merkle proof from dataRooti to
an individual share, it is important to note that a Merkle tree has 2x leaves, and
the Merkle sub-trees for the row and column roots are constructed independently
from dataRooti. Therefore it is necessary to have a wrapper function around
VerifyMerkleProof called VerifyShareMerkleProof with the same parameters which
takes into account how the underlying Merkle tree deals with an unbalanced
number of leaves; this may involve calling VerifyMerkleProof twice for different
portions of the path, or offsetting the index.5
The width of the matrix can be derived as matrixWidthi =
√
1
2dataLengthi.
If we are only interested in the row and column roots of dataRooti, rather than
the actual shares, then we can assume that dataRooti has 2×matrixWidthi leaves
when verifying a Merkle proof of a row or column root.
A light client or full node is able to reconstruct dataRooti from all the row and
column roots by recomputing step 4. In order to gain data availability assurances,
all light clients should at minimum download all the row and column roots needed
to reconstruct dataRooti and check that step 4 was computed correctly, because
as we shall see in Section 5.5, they are necessary to generate fraud proofs of
incorrectly generated extended data.
We nevertheless represent all of the row and column roots as a a single
dataRooti to allow ‘super-light’ clients which do not download the row and col-
5 For example, if the underlying tree simply repeats the last leaves to pad the tree
to 2x leaves, then the wrapper function may be VerifyShareMerkleProof(e, {e →
r}, r, n, i) = VerifyMerkleProof(e, {e→ r}, r, n, i+ bi /
√
1
2
ic× (2dlog2(
√
1
2
i)e−
√
1
2
i)).
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umn roots, but these clients cannot be assured of data availability and thus do
not fully benefit from the increased security of allowing fraud proofs.
5.3 Random Sampling and Network Block Recovery
In order for any share in the 2D Reed-Solomon matrix to be unrecoverable, then
at least (k+ 1)2 out of (2k)2 shares must be unavailable (see Theorem 1). Thus
when light clients receive a new block header from the network, they should
randomly sample 0 < s < (k + 1)2 distinct shares from the extended matrix,
and only accept the block if they receive all shares. Additionally, light clients
gossip shares that they have received to the network, so that the full block can
be recovered by honest full nodes.
The protocol between a light client and the full nodes that it is connected to
works as follows:
1. The light client receives a new block header hi from one of the full nodes it is
connected to, and a set of row and column roots R = (rowRoot1i , rowRoot
2
i , ...,
rowRoot2ki , columnRoot
1
i , columnRoot
2
i , ..., columnRoot
2k
i ). If the check root(R)
= dataRooti is false, then the light client rejects the header.
2. The light client randomly chooses a set of unique (x, y) coordinates S =
{(x0, y0)(x1, y1), ..., (xn, yn)} where 0 < x ≤ matrixWidthi and 0 < y ≤
matrixWidthi, corresponding to points on the extended matrix, and sends
them to one or more of the full nodes it is connected to.
3. If a full node has all of the shares corresponding to the coordinates in S
and their associated Merkle proofs, then for each coordinate (xa, yb) the full
node responds with Mxa,ybi , {Mxa,ybi → rowRootai } or Mxa,ybi , {Mxa,ybi →
columnRootbi}. Note that there are two possible Merkle proofs for each share;
one from the row roots, and one from the column roots, and thus the full
node must also specify for each Merkle proof if it is associated with a row or
column root.
4. For each share Mxa,ybi that the light client has received, the light client checks
VerifyMerkleProof(Mxa,ybi , {Mxa,ybi → rowRootai }, rowRootai ,matrixWidthi, b)
is true if the proof is from a row root, otherwise if the proof is from a column
root then VerifyMerkleProof(Mxa,ybi , {Mxa,ybi → columnRootbi}, columnRootbi ,
matrixWidthi, a) is true.
5. Each share and valid Merkle proof that is received by the light client is
gossiped to all the full nodes that the light client is connected to if the full
nodes do not have them, and those full nodes gossip it to all of the full nodes
that they are connected to.
6. If all the proofs in step 4 succeeded, and no shares are missing from the
sample made in step 2, then the block is accepted as available if within 2× δ
no fraud proofs for the block’s erasure code is received (Section 5.5).
5.4 Selective Share Disclosure
If a block producer selectively releases shares as light clients ask for them, up
to (k+ 1)2 shares, they can violate the soundness property (Definition 1) of the
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clients that ask for the first (k + 1)2 out of (2k)2 shares, as they will accept the
blocks as available despite them being unrecoverable.
This can be alleviated if one assumes an enhanced network model where
a sufficient number of honest light clients make requests such that more than
(k + 1)2 shares will be sampled, and that each sample request for each share is
anonymous (i.e., sample requests cannot be linked to the same client) and the
distribution in which every sample request is received is uniformly random, for
example by using a mix net [9]. As the network would not be able to link differ-
ent per-share sample requests to the same clients, shares cannot be selectively
released on a per-client basis.
We thus assume two network connection models that sample requests can be
made under, which we will analyse in the security analysis:
– Standard model. Sample requests are linkable to the clients that made
them, and the order that they are received is predictable (e.g., they are
received in the order that they were sent).
– Enhanced model. Different sample requests cannot be linked to the same
client, and the order that they are received by the network is uniformly
random with respect to other requests.
5.5 Fraud Proofs of Incorrectly Generated Extended Data
If a full node has enough shares to recover a particular row or column, and after
doing so detects that recovered data does not match its respective row or column
root, then it must distribute a fraud proof consisting of enough shares in that
row or column to be able to recover it, and a Merkle proof for each share.
We define a function VerifyCodecFraudProof that verifies these fraud proofs,
where axisRootji ∈ {rowRootji , columnRootji}. These proofs can also be verified by
‘super-light’ clients as they do not assume any knowledge of the row and column
roots. We denote axis and axj as row or column boolean indicators; 0 for rows
and 1 for columns.
Summary of VerifyCodecFraudProof. The fraud proof consists of the
Merkle root of the incorrectly generated row or column, a Merkle proof that
the root is in the data tree, enough shares to be able to reconstruct that row
or column, and a Merkle proof that each share is in the data tree. The function
takes as input a fraud proof, and checks that (i) all of the shares given by the
prover are in the same row or column and (ii) that the recovered row or column
does not match the row or column root in the block. If both conditions are true,
then the fraud proof is valid, and the block that the fraud proof is for should be
permanently rejected by the client.
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VerifyCodecFraudProof(blockHashi,
axisRootji , {axisRootji → dataRooti}, j, (row or column root)
axis, (row or column indicator)
((sh0, pos0, ax0), (sh1, pos1, ax1), ..., (shk, posk, axk)), (shares)
({sh0 → dataRooti}, {sh1 → dataRooti}, ..., {shk → dataRooti})
) ∈ {true, false}
Let recover be a function that takes a list of shares and their positions
in the row or column ((sh0, pos0), (sh1, pos1), ..., (shk, posk)), and the length of
the original row or column k. The function outputs the full recovered shares
(sh0, sh1, ..., sh2k) or err if the shares are unrecoverable.
recover(((sh0, pos0), (sh1, pos1), ..., (shk, posk)), k) ∈ {(sh0, sh1, ..., sh2k), err}
VerifyCodecFraudProof returns true if all of the following conditions are met:
1. blockHashi corresponds to a block header hi that the client has downloaded
and stored.
2. If axis = 0 (row root), VerifyMerkleProof(axisRootji , {axisRootji → dataRooti},
dataRooti, 2×matrixWidthi, j) returns true.
3. If axis = 1 (col. root), VerifyMerkleProof(axisRootji , {axisRootji → dataRooti},
dataRooti, 2×matrixWidthi, 12dataLengthi + j) returns true.
4. For each (shx, posx, axx), VerifyShareMerkleProof(shx, {shx → dataRooti},
dataRooti, dataLengthi, index) returns true, where index is the expected index
of the shx in the data tree based on posx assuming it is in the same row or
column as axisRootji . See Appendix B for how index can be computed.
Note that full nodes can specify Merkle proofs of shares in rows or columns
from either the row or column roots e.g., if a row is invalid but the full
nodes only has Merkle proofs for the row’s share from column roots. This
also allows for full nodes to generate fraud proofs if there are inconsistencies
in the data between rows and columns e.g., if the same cell in the matrix
has a different share in its row and column trees.
5. root(recover(((sh0, pos0), (sh1, pos1), ..., (shk, posk)), k)) = axisRoot
j
i is false.
If VerifyCodecFraudProof for blockHashi returns true, then the block header
hi is permanently rejected by the light client.
5.6 Sampling Security Analysis
We present how the data availability scheme presented in Section 5 can provide
lights clients with a high level of assurance that block data is available to the
network.
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Fig. 5: Graphical interpretation of Theorem 1. Data is unrecoverable if at least
k + 1 columns (or rows) have each at least k + 1 unavailable shares.
Minimum Unavailable Shares for Unrecoverability Theorem 1 states that
data is unrecoverable if a malicious block proposer withholds k + 1 shares of at
least k+ 1 columns or rows; which makes a total of (k+ 1)2 shares to withhold.
Theorem 1. Given a 2k × 2k matrix E as show in Figure 4, data is unrecov-
erable if at least k + 1 columns or rows have each at least k + 1 unavailable
shares. In that case, the minimum number of shares that must be unrecoverable
is (k + 1)2.
Proof. Suppose a malicious block producer wants to make unrecoverable a share
Ei,j of the 2k×2k matrix E. Recall that Reed-Solomon encoding allow to recover
all 2k shares from any k shares; the block producer will have to (i) make unre-
coverable at least k + 1 shares from the row Ei,∗, and (ii) make unrecoverable
at least k + 1 shares from the column E∗,j .
Let us start from (i); the block producer withholds at least k+ 1 shares from
row Ei,∗. However, each of these k+ 1 withheld shares (Ei,c1 , . . . , Ei,ck+1) ∈ Ei,∗
can be recovered from the available shares of their respective columns E∗,c1 ,
E∗,c2 . . . , E∗,ck+1 . Therefore, the block producer will also have to withhold at
least k + 1 shares from each of these columns. This gives a total of (k + 1) ∗
(k + 1) = (k + 1)2 shares to withhold. Note that at this point, there are not
enough shares left in the matrix to recover any of the (k+ 1)2 shares of columns
(E∗,c1 , . . . E∗,ck+1).
Let us now consider (ii); the block producer withholds at least k + 1 shares
from the column E∗,j to make unrecoverable the share Ei,j . As before, each
shares (Er1,j , . . . , Erk+1,j) ∈ E∗,j can be recovered from the available shares of
their respective row Er1,∗, Er2,∗, . . . , Erk+1,∗. Therefore, the block producer will
also have to withhold at least at least k + 1 shares from each of these rows. As
before, this also gives a total of (k + 1) ∗ (k + 1) = (k + 1)2 shares to withhold.
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However, (i) is equivalent to (ii) by the symmetry of the matrix, and are
actually operating on the same shares; executing (i) on matrix E is equivalent
to executing (ii) on the transpose of matrix E.
Unrecoverable Block Detection Theorem 2 states the probability that a
single light client will sample at least one unavailable share in a matrix with the
minimum unavailable shares for unrecoverability, thus detecting that a block
may be unrecoverable.
Theorem 2. Given a 2k × 2k matrix E as shown in Figure 4, where (k + 1)2
shares are unavailable. If one player randomly samples 0 < s < (k + 1)2 shares
from E, the probability of sampling at least one unavailable share is:
p1(X ≥ 1) = 1−
s−1∏
i=0
(
1− (k + 1)
2
4k2 − i
)
(1)
Proof. We start by assuming that the 2k × 2k matrix E contains q unavailable
shares; If the player performs m trials (0 < s < (k + 1)2), the probability of
finding exactly zero unavailable shares is:
p1(X = 0) =
(
4k2−q
s
)(
4k2
s
) (2)
The numerator of Equation (2) computes the number of ways to pick s chunks
among the set of unavailable shares 4k2 − q (i.e., (4k2−qs )). The denominator
computes the total number of ways to pick any s samples out of the total number
of samples (i.e.,
(
4k2
s
)
).
Then, the probability p1(X ≥ 1) of finding at least one unavailable share can
be easily computed from Equation (2):
p1(X ≥ 1) = 1− p1(X = 0) (3)
= 1−
(
4k2−q
s
)(
4k2
s
) (4)
= 1−
s−1∏
i=0
(
1− q
4k2 − i
)
(5)
which can be re-written as Equation (1) by setting q = (k + 1)2.
Figure 6 shows how this probability varies with s samples for k = 32 and
k = 256; each light client samples at least one unavailable share with about 60%
probability after 3 samplings (i.e., after querying respectively 0.07% of the block
shares for k = 32 and 0.001% of the block shares for k = 256), and with more
than 99% probability after 15 samplings (i.e., after querying respectively 0.4% of
the block shares for k = 16 and 0.005% of the block shares for k = 256). Figure 7
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Fig. 6: Plot of Equation (1)—variation of the probability p1(X ≥ 1) with the
number of sampled shares (s) (computed for k = 32 and k = 256).
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Fig. 7: Variation of the shares size with the size of the matrix (k).
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shows that light clients would have to download about 3.6 KB of shares to be
able to detect incomplete blocks with more than 99% probability for k = 32,
and about 57 bytes of shares for k = 256.
Equation (6) shows a noticeable result: the probability p1(X ≥ 1) is almost
independent of k for large values of k; it is therefore convenient to have a large
matrix size (i.e., k ≥ 128) as this reduces the amount of data that light clients
have to download.
lim
k→∞
p1(X ≥ 1) = lim
k→∞
(
1−
s−1∏
i=0
(
1− (k + 1)
2
4k2 − i
))
= 1− (3/4)s (6)
Under the enhanced model described in Section 5.4, a malicious block pro-
ducer could statistically link light clients based on the shares they query; i.e.,
assuming that a light client would never request twice the same share, a block
producer can deduce that any request for the same share comes from a different
client. To mitigate this problem, light clients could sample without replacement
by performing the procedure for sampling with replacement multiple times, and
only stop when they have sampled s unique values.
Multi-Client Unrecoverable Block Detection Theorem 3 captures the
probability that more than cˆ out of c light clients sample at least one unavailable
share in a matrix with the minimum unavailable shares for unrecoverability.
Theorem 3. Given a 2k × 2k matrix E as shown in Figure 4, where (k + 1)2
shares are unavailable. If c players randomly sample 0 < s < (k + 1)2 shares
from E, the probability that more than cˆ players sample at least one unavailable
share is:
pc(Y > cˆ) = 1−
cˆ∑
j=1
(
c
j
)(
p1(X ≥ 1)
)j(
1− p1(X ≥ 1)
)c−j
(7)
where p1(X ≥ 1) is given by Equation (1).
Proof. We start by computing the probability that exactly cˆ players sample at
least one unavailable share; this probability is given by the binomial probability
mass function:
ps,cˆ(Y = cˆ) =
(
c
cˆ
)(
p1(X ≥ 1)
)cˆ(
1− p1(X ≥ 1)
)c−cˆ
(8)
where p1(X ≥ 1) is given by Equation (1). Equation (8) describes the probabil-
ity that cˆ players succeed to sample at least one unavailable share. This can be
viewed as the probability of observing cˆ successes each happening with proba-
bility p1, and (c − cˆ) failures each happening with probability 1− p1; there are(
c
cˆ
)
possible ways of sequencing these successes and failures.
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Equation (8) easily generalises to the binomial cumulative distribution func-
tion expressed in Equation (9)—the probability of observing at most cˆ successes
is the sum of the probabilities of observing j successes for j = 1, . . . , cˆ.
pc(Y ≤ cˆ) =
cˆ∑
j=1
(
c
j
)(
p1(X ≥ 1)
)j(
1− p1(X ≥ 1)
)c−j
(9)
Therefore the probability of observing more than cˆ successes is given by Equa-
tion (10) below, which expands as Equation (7).
pc(Y > cˆ) = 1− pc(Y ≤ cˆ) (10)
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Fig. 8: Plot of Equation (7)—variation of the number of light clients cˆ for which
pc(Y > cˆ) ≥ 0.99 with the sampling size s. The total number of clients is fixed
to c = 1000, and the matrix sizes are k = 64, 128, 256; Equation (7) is however
almost independent of k, as indicated by Equation (6).
Figure 8 shows the variation of the number of light clients cˆ for which pc(Y >
cˆ) ≥ 0.99 with the sampling size s. The total number of clients is fixed to
c = 1000, and the matrix sizes are k = 64, 128, 256; Equation (7) is however
almost independent of k, as indicated by Equation (6). This figure can be used
to determine the number of light clients that will detect incomplete matrices with
high probability (pc(Y > cˆ) ≥ 0.99), and that there is little gain in increasing s
over 15.
Recovery and Selective Share Disclosure Corollary 1 presents the proba-
bility that light clients collectively samples enough shares to recover every share
of the 2k × 2k matrix.
If the light clients collectively sample all but (k + 1)2 distinct shares, the
block producer cannot release any more shares without allowing the network to
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recover the whole matrix; it follows from Theorem 1 that light clients need to
collect at least:
γ = (2k)2 − (k + 1)2 + 1 = k(3k − 2)
distinct shares (randomly chosen) to have the certainty to be able to recover
the 2k × 2k matrix. We are therefore interested in the probability that light
clients—each sampling s distinct shares—collectively samples at least γ distinct
shares; this probability is expressed by Corollary 1.
Theorem 4. (Euler [15]) the probability that the number of distinct elements
sampled from a set of n elements, after c drawings with replacement of s distinct
elements each, is at least all but λ elements6:
pe(Z ≥ n− λ) = 1−
∞∑
i=1
(−1)i
(
λ+ i− 1
λ
)(
n
λ+ i
)(
Wi
)c
(11)
where Wi =
(
n− λ− i
s
)/(
n
s
)
Corollary 1. Given a 2k × 2k matrix E as shown in Figure 4, where each of
c players randomly samples s distinct shares from E. The probability that the
players collectively sample at least γ = k(3k − 2) distinct shares is pe(Z ≥ γ)
Proof. Corollary 1 can be easily proven by substituting λ = n−γ and n = (2k)2
into Theorem 4.
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Fig. 9: Plot of Corollary 1—variation of the probability pe(Z ≥ γ) with the
number of clients (c) for different values of s and k.
Contrarily to Equation (7), Figure 9 shows that pe(Z ≥ γ) depends on the
matrix size k.
6 This problem is also known as the coupon collector’s problem with group drawing [16].
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pe(Z ≥ γ) s = 2 s = 5 s = 10 s = 20 s = 50
k = 16 692 277 138 69 28
k = 32 2805 1,122 561 280 112
k = 64 11,289 4,516 2,258 1,129 451
k = 128 >40,000 ∼18,000 ∼9,000 ∼4,500 1,811
Table 1: Minimum number of light clients (c) required to achieve pe(Z ≥ γ) >
0.99 for various values of k and s. The approximate values have been approached
numerically as evaluating Theorem 4 can be extremely resource-intensive for
large values of k.
5.7 Properties Security Analysis
Standard Model
Corollary 2. Under the standard model, a block producer cannot cause sound-
ness (Definition 1) and agreement (Definition 2) to fail for more than c honest
clients with a probability lower than p1(X ≥ 1) per client, where c is determined
by the probability distribution pe(Z ≥ γ).
Proof. Corollary 1 shows that with probability pe(Z ≥ γ), c honest clients will
sample enough shares to collectively recover the full block. Honest clients will
gossip these shares to full nodes which then gossip them to each other, and within
k× δ at least one honest full node will then recover the full block data, thus sat-
isfying soundness with a probability of 1− p1(X ≥ 1) per client (the probability
of the block producer not passing the client’s random sampling challenge when
all the block data is available).
If the data is available and no fraud proofs of incorrectly generated extended
data was received by the client, then no other client will receive a fraud proof
either, due to our assumption that there is at least one honest full node in the
network and honest light clients are not under an eclipse attack, thus satisfying
agreement with a probability of 1− p1(X ≥ 1) per client.
Due to the selective share disclosure attack described in Section 5.4, this
means that the block producer can violate soundness and agreement of the first
c clients that make sample requests, as the block producer can stop releasing
shares just before it is about to release the final shares to allow the block to be
recoverable.
Enhanced Model
Corollary 3. Under the enhanced model, a block producer cannot cause sound-
ness (Definition 1) and agreement (Definition 2) to fail with a probability lower
than px(X ≥ 1) per client,
px(X ≥ 1) =
d∑
i=1
(
s
i
)(
s(c−1)
d−i
)(
c·s
d
) (12)
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where c is the number of clients and d is the number of requests that the block
producer must deny to prevent full nodes from recovering the data.
Proof. The proof of Corollary 3 starts as the proof of Corollary 2; honest light
clients collectively samples enough shares to recover the full block data by gossip-
ing these shares to full nodes; soundness is satisfied with probability 1−p1(X ≥
1) per client. None of the light clients receive fraud proofs if the full data is avail-
able and no valid fraud proofs are sent over the network, and all light clients
eventually receive a valid fraud proof if one is sent, satisfying agreement with
the same probability.
However, the enhanced model assumes that all sample requests come through
a perfect mix network (i.e., requests are unlinkable between each other), and de-
feats the selective shares disclosure attack presented in Section 5.4. The enhanced
model removes the notion of ‘first’ clients described in Corollary 2 as block pro-
ducers cannot distinguish which requests comes from which client (since requests
are unlikable). Furthermore, if block producers randomly deny some requests,
light clients would uniformly see some of their sample requests denied, and each
light client would therefore consider the block invalid with equal probability.
Particularly, if c light clients each sample 0 < s < (k + 1)2 shares, block
producers observe a total of (c ·s) indistinguishable requests. Let us assume that
a malicious block producer must deny at least d request to prevent full nodes
from recovering the block data. The probability that a light client observes at
least one of its requests denied (and thus rejects the block) is given by px(X ≥ 1)
in Equation (12). The numerator of Equation (12) computes the number of ways
of picking i of the denied requests among the s requests sent by the light client
(i.e.,
(
s
i
)
), multiplied by the number of ways to pick the remaining d− i requests
among the set of requests sent by other light clients: c · s − s = s(c − 1) (i.e.,(
s(c−1)
d−i
)
). The denominator computes the total number of ways to pick any d
requests out of the total number of requests (i.e.,
(
c·s
d
)
). The probability that at
least one of the denied requests comes from a particular client is the sum of the
probabilities for i = 1, . . . , d.
Like Equation (1), Equation (12) rapidly grows and shows that light clients
reject the block if invalid (for appropriate values of d). The value of d can be
approximated using Corollary 1, and depends on s and c. To provide a quick
intuition, if we assume that the light clients collectively sample at least once
every share of the block, a malicious block producer must deny at least (k+ 1)2
requests on different shares to prevent full nodes from recovering the block data;
since multiple requests can sample the same shares, d ≥ (k + 1)2.
6 Performance and Implementation
We implemented the data availability proof scheme described in Section 5 and
a prototype of the state transition fraud proof scheme described in Section 4 in
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Object Worst case space complexity
State fraud proof O(p + p log(d) + w log(s) + w)
Availability fraud proof O(d0.5 + d0.5 log(d0.5))
Single sample response O(shareSize + log(d))
Block header with axis roots O(d0.5)
Block header excl. axis roots O(1)
Table 2: Worst case space complexity for various objects. p represents the number
of transactions in a period, w represents the number of state witnesses for those
transactions, d is short for dataLength, and s is the number of key-value pairs in
the state tree.
2,683 lines of Go code and released the code as a series of free and open-source
libraries.7
We first evaluate the space and time complexity of the scheme in Section 6.1
and then present the performance benchmarks of our implementation in Sec-
tion 6.2. We perform the measurements on a laptop with an Intel Core i5 1.3GHz
processor and 16GB of RAM, and use SHA-256 for hashing.
6.1 Space and Time Complexity
Table 2 shows the space complexity for different objects. We observe that the
size of the state transition fraud proofs only grows logarithmically with the size
of the block and state, whereas the availability fraud proofs (as well as block
headers with the axis roots) grows at least in proportion to the square root of
the size of the block.
Table 3 shows the time complexity for various actions. For generating and
verifying fraud proofs, we note that generating and verifying Merkle proofs for
state witnesses is O(1) as a sparse Merkle tree has a static depth. The most
expensive operation is generating availability fraud proofs, as Lagrange interpo-
lation takes O(k2) time to encode or decode a row/column with k shares, but
this can be reduced to O(k log(k)) time with algorithms based on Fast Fourier
Transforms (FFT) [22,33].
6.2 Benchmarks
Table 4 shows the size of various objects when transmitted over the network.
We observe that the size of the state fraud proof only increases logarithmically
7 2D Reed-Solomon Merkle tree data availability scheme: https://github.com/
musalbas/rsmt2d
State transition fraud proofs prototype: https://github.com/asonnino/
fraudproofs-prototype
Sparse Merkle tree library: https://github.com/musalbas/smt
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Action Worst case time complexity
[G] State fraud proof O(b + p log(d) + w)
[V] State fraud proof O(p + p log(d) + w)
[G] Availability fraud proof O(d2 + d0.5 log(d0.5))
[V] Availability fraud proof O(d + d0.5 log(d0.5))
[G] Availability fraud proof (FFTs) O(d× d0.5 log(d0.5))
[V] Availability fraud proof (FFTs) O(d0.5 log(d0.5))
[G] Single sample response O(log(d0.5))
[V] Single sample response O(log(d0.5))
Table 3: Worst case time complexity for various actions, where [G] means gen-
erate and [V] means verify. p represents the number of transactions in a period,
b represents the number of transactions in the block, w represents the number
of state witnesses for those transactions, d is short for dataLength, and s is the
number of key-value pairs in the state tree. For generating and verifying state
fraud proofs, we assume that each transaction takes the same amount of time
to process. For generating fraud proofs, we also include the cost of verifying the
block itself.
Object (10 tx/period) Size (∼0.25MB block) Size (∼1MB block)
State fraud proof 14,090b 14,410b
Availability fraud proof 12,320b 26,688b
Single sample response 320b 368b
Block header with. axis roots 2,176b 4,224b
Block header excl. axis roots 128b 128b
Table 4: Illustrative sizes for objects for ∼0.25MB and ∼1MB blocks, assuming
that a period consists of 10 transactions, the average transaction size is 225
bytes, and that conservatively there are 230 non-default nodes in the state tree.
with the size of the block; this is because the number of transactions in a period
remains static, but the size of the Merkle proof for each transaction increases
slightly. Block size impacts the size of availability fraud proofs and the axis roots
the most, as the size of a single row or column is proportional to the square root
of the size of the block.
Table 5 shows the computation time for generating and verifying various
objects; the benchmark for state fraud proof generation includes time spent
verifying the block. Although verification is linear in the size of the block, in
our implementation it has a high constant factor due to the need for 256 hash
operations per update in the tree. This can be improved by using a SHA-256
library that uses SIMD instructions [17] and splitting up the tree into sub-
trees [11] so that updates can be processed in parallel. Alternatively, a more
complex key-value tree construction can be used such as a Patricia tree [41].
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Action Time (∼0.25MB block) Time (∼1MB block)
[G] State fraud proof 289.78 ms 981.88 ms
[V] State fraud proof 1.50 ms 1.50 ms
[G] Availability fraud proof 7.96ms 50.88ms
[V] Availability fraud proof 0.05ms 0.19ms
[G] Single sample response < 0.00001ms < 0.00001ms
[V] Single sample response < 0.00001ms < 0.00001ms
Table 5: Computation time (mean over ten repeats) for various actions, where
[G] means generate and [V] means verify. We assume that a period consists of
10 transactions, the average transaction size is 225 bytes, and each transaction
writes to one key in the state tree.
As expected, verifying an availability fraud proof is significantly quicker than
generating one. This is because generation requires checking the entire data
matrix, whereas verification only requires checking one row or column. Note that
we used a library that uses standard Reed-Solomon algorithms that take O(k2)
time to encode/decode—the benchmarks can be improved by using FFT-based
algorithms that take O(k log(k)) time.
7 Discussion
7.1 Succinct Proofs of Computation
There have been advances in succinct proofs of computation, including zk-
SNARKs [5] and more recently zk-STARKs [4], which allow a prover to prove
that f(x,W ) = y for some provided x and y, where even if the witness W is
very large in size and the computation f takes a very long time to compute,
the proof itself has only logarithmic or constant size and takes logarithmic or
constant time to verify.
For future work, we can require block headers to come with such a proof
to show that they are correctly erasure coded, removing the need for fraud
proofs. Also note that the only significant advantage of the 2D Reed Solomon
scheme over the 1D scheme is smaller fraud proofs, so if succinct proofs are used
switching back to 1D may be optimal (constructing a legitimate erasure code
takes only O(n log(n)) computation time for n shares if Fast Fourier Transforms
are used [22,33]).
Note that while succinct proofs of computation of the block state root tran-
sition function can be used to remove the need for fraud proofs, they do not
remove the need for availability proofs. If malicious majority broadcasts a block
for which the data is not available, they can deny honest full nodes the in-
formation that they need to construct the full up-to-date state, and generate
witnesses (i.e., Merkle branches) for transactions touching certain accounts. By
preventing witness creation, a block with unavailable data can make accounts
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permanently inaccessible. [8] uses information-theoretic arguments to show that
even constructions such as cryptographic accumulators cannot remove the need
to verify availability of O(n) data to ensure that all witnesses can be correctly
updated.
7.2 Locally decodable codes
Another strategy for removing the need for fraud proofs from this scheme is
to use the local decodability feature of multi-dimensional Reed-Solomon codes
[43]. Particularly, we construct a “proof of proximity” that consists of a set of
pseudorandomly selected rows and columns (or axis-parallel lines more generally
for higher-dimensional codes), using the Merkle root of the data as a source of
entropy, which the verifier can verify have degree < k, thereby probabilistically
verifying that a very high percentage of all axis-parallel lines have degree < k
and therefore any non-axis-parallel line has degree < d ∗ k. The file would be
extended from k ∗ ... ∗ k to (k ∗ 2d) ∗ ... ∗ (k ∗ 2d).
Any block (header) that comes with a valid proof of proximity is admissible,
even if some small portion of the extended polynomial data is incorrect. Because
of this, a single Merkle branch no longer suffices to prove a single value. Instead,
the verifier can select a random non-axis-parallel line that passes through the
point, and require the prover to provide at least 32 ∗ d points along the line. The
verifier computes the correct value at the desired point, doing error correction
if necessary. For added soundness, the verifier can select multiple random non-
axis-parallel lines.
This scheme has the benefit that it does not rely on fraud proofs or expensive
proofs of computation, but has the weaknesses that (i) it requires more encoded
data to be stored across the network, though this is mitigated by the fact that
the larger number of shares makes it safer to have a smaller number of copies
of each share stored across the network, and (ii) Merkle proofs become roughly
two orders of magnitude larger.
8 Related Work
The original Bitcoin whitepaper [26] briefly mentions the possibility of ‘alerts’,
which are messages sent by full nodes to alert light clients that a block is invalid,
prompting them to download the full block to verify the inconsistency. Little
further exploration has been done on this, partly due to the data availability
problem.
There have been online discussions about how one may go about designing
a fraud proof system [32, 38], however no complete design that deals with all
block invalidity cases and data availability has been proposed. These earlier
systems have taken the approach of attempting to design a fraud proof for each
possible way to create a block that violates the transaction validity rules (e.g.,
double spending inputs, mining a block with a reward too high, etc), whereas
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this paper generalises the blockchain into a state transition system with only
one fraud proof.
On the data availability side, Perard et al. [29] have proposed using era-
sure coding to allow light clients to voluntarily contribute to help storing the
blockchain without having to download all of it, however they do not propose
a scheme to allow light clients to verify that the data is available via random
sampling and fraud proofs of incorrectly generated erasure codes.
9 Conclusion
We presented, implemented and evaluated a complete fraud and data availability
proof scheme, which enables light clients to have security guarantees almost at
the level of a full node, with the added assumptions that there is at least one
honest full node in the network that distributes fraud proofs within a maximum
network delay, and that there is a minimum number of light clients in the network
to collectively recover blocks.
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A Double-tree Design
In the paper we have considered that block headers contain a single data root
dataRooti that includes both transactions and intermediate state roots, in order
to allow for data availability proofs. However, we can design a more simplified
structure with two trees, txRooti and txLengthi for transactions and traceRooti
and traceLengthi for intermediate state roots. Each leaf of the txRooti is a trans-
action and each leaf of the traceRooti is an intermediate state root. This does
not require arranging data into fixed-size shares, however it does not support
data availability proofs.
A.1 Period Criterion
The protocol may define a rule such that an intermediate state root must be
added to the trace Merkle tree after a certain criterion has been met, for example
after every p transactions. We called this a ‘period criterion’. However unlike the
period criterion mechanism described in Section 4.3, we assume that the period
criterion under the double-tree design is a fixed number of transactions, so that
it is possible for a fraud proof verified to know which trace is mapped to a
specific transaction without downloading all the transactions (i.e., there is a
deterministic mapping between transaction indexes and trace indexes).
Based on the rule, we assume a function period(txIndex) = traceIndex that
returns the index traceIndex of the intermediate trace root in the execution trace
that is the pre-state for a transaction at index txIndex in the block’s transaction
list, or −1 if the pre-state if the previous block’s stateRoot. We denote traceji as
the jth intermediate state root for block i in the tree committed to by traceRoot.
If period(txIndex) = traceIndex, the pre-state root is tracetraceIndexi if traceIndex ≥
0, or stateRoot if traceIndex = −1.
A standard implementation of period may be period(txIndex) = b txIndexp c − 1
if there is a trace every p transactions.
A.2 Proof of Invalid State Transition
A miner may incorrectly compute stateRooti, for example by placing a series of
random bytes as stateRooti, or by crafting a malicious stateRooti that modifies
the state in an invalid way. We can thus use the execution trace provided by
traceRooti to prove that some part of the execution trace was invalid.
We define a function VerifyTransitionFraudProof and its parameters which
verifies fraud proofs received from full nodes. If the fraud proof is valid, then the
block that the fraud proof is for is permanently rejected by the client.
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VerifyTransitionFraudProof(blockHashi,
tracexi , {tracexi → traceRooti}, x, (pre-state root)
tracex+1i , {tracex+1i → traceRooti}, (post-state root)
(tyi , t
y+1
i , ..., t
y+m
i ), y, (transactions)
({tyi → txRooti}, {ty+1i → txRooti}}, ..., {ty+mi → txRooti}}),
(wyi , w
y+1
i , ..., w
y+m
i ), (state witnesses)
) ∈ {true, false}
The pre-state root may be omitted from the fraud proof parameters if it
is simply the state root of the previous block, and the post-state root may be
omitted if it is the state root of the current block, as the client already knows
these roots as they are in the block headers.
VerifyTransitionFraudProof returns true if all of the following conditions are
met, otherwise false is returned:
1. blockHashi corresponds to a block header hi that the client has downloaded
and stored.
2. VerifyMerkleProof(tracexi , {tracexi → traceRooti}, traceRooti, traceLengthi, x)
returns true if a pre-state root is specified.
3. VerifyMerkleProof(tracex+1i , {tracex+1i → traceRooti}, traceRooti, traceLengthi,
x+ 1) returns true if a post-state root is specified.
4. For each transaction ty+ai in the proof, period(y+a) = x is true if a pre-state
root is specified, otherwise period(y + a) = −1 and y = 0 is true.
5. For each transaction ty+ai in the proof, VerifyMerkleProof(t
y+a
i , {ty+ai →
txRooti}, txRooti, txLengthi, y + a) returns true.
6. Let the intermediate state roots after applying every transaction in the
proof one at a time be interRootji = rootTransition(interRoot
j−1
i , t
j
i , w
j
i ). If
a pre-state root is specfied, then the base case is interRootyi = trace
x
i , oth-
erwise interRootyi = stateRooti−1. If a post-state is specified, trace
x+1
i =
interRooty+mi is true, otherwise stateRooti = interRoot
y+m
i and y + m =
txLengthi is true.
B Computation of index in Step 4 of VerifyCodecFraudProof
In Step 4 of VerifyCodecFraudProof in Section 5.5, index can be computed as
follows:
– If axis = 0 and axx = 0, index = j ∗matrixWidthi + posx.
– If axis = 1 and axx = 0, index = posx ∗matrixWidthi + j.
– If axis = 1 and axx = 1, index =
1
2dataLengthi + j ∗matrixWidthi + posx.
– If axis = 0 and axx = 1, index =
1
2dataLengthi + posx ∗matrixWidthi + j.
